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By Joseph H. Haimowitz
T
he computer sector has been one of the
fastest growing segments of the U.S.
economy over the past two decades.
Computers appear to be everywhere—on the
desks of executives, on the factory floor, in the
classroom, at home, and, these days, even in
people’s pockets. By all accounts, computers
appear to be rapidly changing the way many of
us conduct business, recreate, and communicate.
The proliferation of computers has made the
world seem much smaller, as computer related
innovations,suchastheInternet,letindividuals
on opposite sides of the world interact in ways
that were unimagined 20 years ago. As a result,
spending on computers has exploded.
The dynamic nature of the computer sector
andthesector’sincreasedprominenceinoverall
spendingintheeconomyhaveledsomeanalysts
to suggest that the economy is entering a New
Era, where the economy will return to the high-
growth, low-inflation conditions of the 1950s
and 1960s.
1Although spending on computers is
spreadthroughoutallsectorsoftheeconomy,the
key channel through which the economy might
be transformed is investment spending on com-
putersbybusinesses.Spendingoncomputersby
businesses is key because the contribution of
computers to output growth depends crucially
onthequantityofcomputersusedintheproduc-
tion process. If rapid spending on computers
does lead to faster output growth, then under-
standing the magnitude of the contribution of
computercapitaltooutputgrowthwillbecrucial
for long-run forecasting and policy analysis.
Thisarticleexamineswhethercomputershave
fundamentally changed the economy. The first
sectiondocumentsthedevelopmentsinthecom-
puter sector that have led many analysts to sug-
gest that a computer-led surge in output growth
isunderway.Inparticular,itfocusesontherapid
increases in investment spending on computing
equipment by businesses and the importance of
these increases for increases in overall invest-
ment spending. The second section uses a stan-
dard framework to show that the resulting
growth in the capital stock of computing equip-
ment has made only a modest contribution to
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underlying the standard framework, however,
showsthatthecontributionofcomputerstoout-
put growth appears to have been somewhat
larger.Thethirdsectiondiscusseswhethercom-
puters might generate a larger pickup in output
growth in the future. The article concludes that
computers have had only a modest impact on
output growth until now, but the future impact
could be larger.
I. THE SURGE IN COMPUTER
SPENDING
Thecasualobservationthatcomputersseemto
be everywhere is borne out by spending data.
Spending on computers has been growing rap-
idly in all sectors of the economy.
How are computers defined in the
National Income and Product Accounts?
Computers appear as a detailed category in
most of the major components of GDP. The
National Income and Product Accounts consist
ofsixmajorcomponents.Thesecomponentsare
personal consumption expenditures, business
fixed investment, residential fixed investment,
government expenditures, net exports, and
inventory investment. Each of these compo-
nents can be divided into finer levels of detail.
For example, the business fixed investment
component of GDP consists of two major sub-
components, structures and producers’ durable
equipment, which themselves can be divided
intofinerlevelsofdetail.Thesecondcolumnof
Table1describeswherecomputersappearinthe
NIPA accounts. For example, in the personal
consumption expenditures component of GDP,
computers appear as a detailed category within
consumer durable goods.
Each major component of the NIPAaccounts
definesthecomputersectorsomewhatdifferently.
The third column of Table 1 lists how computers
are defined in each of the major components
of GDP. For personal consumption expenditures
and net exports, computers include hardware
andsoftware.Forbusinessfixedinvestmentand
government spending, computers include hard-
ware but exclude software that does not come
preloaded with the hardware. In these sectors,
spending on software is treated as an expense
rather than as a capital investment.
How important is computer spending as a
share of overall spending?
The computer sector’s share of total spending
has increased because growth in this sector,
which includes all computing equipment and
software as defined in Table 1, has outstripped
growth in the rest of the economy (Chart 1).
From1982to1996,growthinthecomputersec-
tor averaged over 26 percent annually, while
growthintheeconomyasawholeaveragedless
than 2.6 percent annually.
2 The difference has
been even more evident in recent years. For
example, from 1994 to 1996 computer sector
growthexceeded55percent,whiletheeconomy
as a whole expanded 2.5 percent.
Some analysts have argued that the computer
sector cannot have a large economic effect
because its share of GDPis so small. While it is
true that spending on computers as a share of
totalspendingissmall,thissharehasbeenrising






The computer sector’s average share of real
spending increased over fivefold between the
1982-86 and 1992-96 periods. Although the
computer sector only accounted for an average
of 0.29 percent of total spending during the
1982-86 period, it accounted for over 1.58 per-
centoftotalspendingduringthe1992-96period.
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sectorasashareoftheeconomyismirroredinall
oftheeconomy’smajorcomponents.Therateof
increase, however, has varied widely across the
components.Forexample,spendingoncomputers





on computers can have a long-run effect on the
economyisthroughtheinvestmentincomputers
bybusinesses.Theshareofbusinessinvestment
spending on computers in total business invest-
ment spending has grown rapidly and has
exceeded the share of computer spending in
spending for all other major GDP categories
(Table 2). From 1992 to 1996, real business
investment in computers represented over 13
percentofallbusinessinvestmentandnearly18
percent of business investment in equipment.
Thus, spending on computing equipment has
become an increasingly important part of busi-
ness investment spending. Some analysts sug-
gest that this trend has important implications
for output growth. The rest of this article ana-
lyzes the impact on economic growth of invest-
ment spending on computing equipment by
businesses in the recent past and the potential
impact of this spending in the future.
II. HOW HAS INVESTMENT IN
COMPUTERS INFLUENCED
OUTPUT GROWTH IN RECENT
YEARS?
Output depends on many factors, including
the total hours of labor, education of the work
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Table 1
COMPUTERS IN THE NATIONAL INCOME AND PRODUCT ACCOUNTS
Major component of GDP Where do computers appear? How are computers defined?
Personal consumption
expenditures
Detailed level of consumer durables. Computers include both hard-
ware and software.
Business fixed investment Detailed level of producer’s dura-
ble equipment.
Computers include hardware
but do not include software
unless the software comes
preloaded on the hardware.
Government Detailed level of equipment invest-
ment in federal defense, federal
nondefense, and state and local.
Computers include hardware
but do not include software
unless the software comes
preloaded on the hardware.
Net exports Detailed level of nonautomotive
capital goods in exports and imports.
Computers include both hard-
ware and software.force, technology, and the amount of capital.
Output growth, in turn, depends on changes in
these factors. In particular, the contribution of
computers to output growth is the amount by
whichoutputgrowthwouldhavebeenreducedif
the stock of computer capital had not changed
while all the other factors that affect output
changedastheydid.Thesizeofthiscontribution
depends on the importance of the stock of com-
puter capital relative to the other factors and by
how much the stock of computer capital
increased. This section describes an analytical




Assessing the role of computers in
economic growth: The analytical
framework
The framework used to assess the role of
computers in economic growth is the growth
accounting framework pioneered by Denison.
4
This growth accounting framework was used to
examine the contribution of computers by Oliner
and Sichel and by Sichel. This section closely
followstheframeworkusedbythoseauthorsbut
uses different data. In addition to extending the
sample they examined, this analysis uses new
chain-weighted measures of the real capital stock
published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA).
5 This is particularly important for the
30 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Chart 1
GROWTH RATES OF GDP AND COMPUTERS
Percent change from year earlier











1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1982computer sector because of the rapid decline in
computer prices. Also, the depreciation rates
used here reflect a new BEA methodology for
estimating the depreciation of capital assets.
Thegrowthaccountingframeworkisbasedon
three important assumptions. First, constant
returnstoscaleinproductionareassumed.Con-
stant returns to scale in production imply, for
example, that if the quantities of all inputs are
doubled then output will also double. Second,
theframeworkassumesthatthelastdollarspent
on computer investment earns the same com-
petitive rate of return as the last dollar spent on
any other investment. Third, it assumes that no
externalities exist. An externality occurs when-
evertheactivitiesofonepersonorfirmaffectthe
activitiesofothersinwaysthatarenottakeninto
account by the operation of the market. In the
case of computers, positive externalities exist if
investment in computers by one firm increases
productivity in other firms. The absence of
externalitiesensuresthatthesocialrateofreturn
and private rate of return to investment in an
asset are equal.
These three assumptions imply that the contri-
bution of computing equipment to output growth
can be calculated as
The first factor that determines the contribu-
tionofcomputerstooutputgrowthistheincome
share of computing equipment. The income
shareofcomputingequipmentistheimportance
ofthestockofcomputersrelativetootherfactors
such as labor, other capital inputs, the level of
technology available, and the education of the
work force. More precisely, it is the fraction by
which output would increase if the real stock of
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Table 2
REAL COMPUTER SPENDING AS A SHARE OF SPENDING IN THE
MAJOR GDP CATEGORIES
Category 1982-86 1987-91 1992-96
Total GDP .29 .65 1.58
Personal consumption expenditures .03 .13 .69
Durable goods .26 1.08 5.56
Business fixed investment 2.12 4.81 13.11
Producer’s durable equipment 3.53 7.36 17.88
Total government .18 .41 .81
Net exports
Exports 1.50 3.39 7.23
Imports .72 2.59 8.24









































Assessing the role of computers in
economic growth: The analysis
The remainder of this section uses this frame-
worktoexaminethecontributionthatcomputers
have made to output growth in the recent past.
First, the contribution of computing equipment
to output growth under the standard framework
is examined. Second, the contribution is exam-
ined with the standard framework modified by
relaxing some of the assumptions.
Data. As detailed in the box, calculating the
income share of computing equipment requires
data on the nominal capital stock of computing
equipment, nominal output, the nominal com-
petitive net rate of return, the depreciation rate
forcomputingequipment,andthegrowthrateof
the price of computing equipment. Annual data
on the nominal capital stock of computing
equipment were obtained from data published
by the BEA. Nominal output is the BEA series
for the nominal output of the private nonfarm
business sector. The nominal competitive net
rate of return is unobserved and must be esti-
mated.
6 The depreciation rate for computing
equipmentistheBEA’smeasureofdepreciation
for office, computing, and accounting machin-
ery and takes the value of 27.29 percent prior to
1978 and 31.19 percent thereafter. The price
measureforcomputingequipmentwasobtained
by using annual BEA data on real and nominal
businessinvestmentincomputingequipmentto




capital stock of computing equipment, was cal-
culated by deflating the nominal stock of com-
puting equipment using the price measure for
computing equipment.
Contributionsunderthestandardframework.
Table 3 shows how the contribution of comput-
ingequipmenttothegrowthofrealgrossoutput
hasevolvedsince1972.Thefirstrowofthetable




bution of computing equipment to output
growth is the product of the income share of
computingequipmentandthegrowthrateofthe
real capital stock of computing equipment. The
resultingpercentage-pointcontributionofcom-












puting equipment grew at an average rate of 35
percent each year (row 2). This is a result of the
small income share of computing equipment,
which averaged less than 1 percent over the
1972-96 period (row 1). The income share of






of total output growth, the contribution of com-
puting equipment to output growth has actually
fallen since the late 1970s. This is largely the
result of a slowdown in the growth rate of thereal
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DEVELOPING THE STANDARD GROWTH
ACCOUNTING FRAMEWORK
The three assumptions on which the stan-
dardgrowthaccountingframeworkarebased
imply that the contribution of computing
equipment toward output growth is calcu-
lated as the product of the income share of
computingequipmentandthegrowthrateof
the real capital stock of computing equip-
ment.
7 This box develops this relationship
more formally.
In any period, the return earned by $1 of
computing equipment capital, after deprecia-
tion and changes in the price of the equipment
have been factored in, is the gross rate of
return to computing equipment which can be
expressed as
grossrateof return i P cc =+ - ( & ), d
where i is the nominal competitive net rate
of return, d c is the depreciation rate for
computing equipment, and & Pc is the rate of
nominal capital gain on computing equip-
ment.
8Thus, the income flow, or dollar value
of output, generated by the entire stock of
computingequipmentissimplytheproduct
of the gross rate of return to computing
equipment and the nominal stock of com-
puting equipment which can be repre-
sented as
income flow i P P K cc c c =+ - ( & ), d
where Pc is the price of computing equipment
andK c istherealstockofcomputingequipment.
Sincecomputingequipmentisoneofmany
types of inputs into the production process,
the income flow generated by computing
equipmentisonlyonepartofthetotalincome
flow generated by all inputs. The share of
income generated by computing equipment
can be calculated as the ratio of the income
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,
where PY is nominal output. The contribu-
tion of computing equipment to output
growthcanthenbeexpressedastheproduct
of the income share of computing equip-
mentandtherateofgrowthoftherealcapital









( & ) & d
,
where & K c isthegrowthrateoftherealcapital
stock of computing equipment. To see why
this is the case consider an economy where
computing equipment is the only input into
theproductionprocess.Then,assumingthat
there is no outside factors that increase the
productivityofthestockofcomputingequip-
ment, output will be unchanged if the stock
of computing equipment is unchanged.capital stock of computing equipment since the
late1970s.AsthesecondlineofTable3shows,
growth in the real capital stock of computing
equipment averaged almost 57 percent over the
1977-81period,comparedtoamuchlower30.5
percent average growth rate during the 1992-96
period.
9 One factor that has partially mitigated
the slowing growth of the real capital stock of
computingequipmenthasbeenthesteadyrisein
the income share of computing equipment. The
income share of equipment has risen primarily
because computing equipment has represented an
increasinglylargerpartoftheoverallcapitalstock.
Contributionsunderalternativeassumptions.
The assumptions under which the standard
framework was derived are somewhat restric-
tive.Thissubsectionexaminesthesensitivityof
the results under the standard framework to
alternative, less restrictive assumptions.
One important feature of the standard growth
frameworkusedinthisanalysisisthatitassumes
there are no externalities. Some economists
arguethatcapitalmay,infact,generatesubstan-
tial positive externalities. If capital does gener-
ate positive externalities, then the income share
used in calculating the contribution of comput-
ing equipment to output growth is understated.
The reason for this understatement is that the
competitive nominal net rate of return used in
calculating the income share of computing
equipment only measures the private returns to
firmsfrominvestingincapital.Ifcapitalinvest-
ment generates positive externalities, then
investment in capital generates social returns in
excess of the private returns to firms that made
the investment. These excess returns are not
included when calculating the competitive nomi-
nal net rate of return. Therefore, to capture the
positiveexternalitiesandtoeliminatetheunder-
statement of the income share of computing
equipment, the competitive nominal net rate of
returnismodifiedtoreflectthereturnstosociety
from a businesses’ investment as well as the
return to the business from its own investment.
34 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
Table 3
CONTRIBUTION OF COMPUTING EQUIPMENT TO REAL OUTPUT OF
THE PRIVATE NONFARM BUSINESS SECTOR
1972-96 1972-76 1977-81 1982-86 1987-91 1992-96
(1) Income share of computing
equipment
.0089 .0046 .0062 .0098 .0117 .0123
(2) Growth rate of the real stock
of computing equipment
34.96 30.91 56.91 39.47 17.01 30.50
(3) Percentage point contribution
of computing equipment
(1) x (2)
.31 .14 .35 .39 .20 .38
(4) Growth rate of real output 2.90 3.42 2.34 3.40 1.75 3.59
(5) Share of total growth
(3)¸(4)
.1069 .0409 .1496 .1147 .1143 .1059
Note: Author’s calculations are based upon data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Bureau of Labor
Statistics. All figures are averaged over the indicated time period.In two papers Romer (1986,1987) argues that
capital accumulation may result in knowledge




Henry Ford designed the first assembly line for
themassproductionoftheModelT,hewasusing
technology that was already available but in a
new, more efficient manner. As a result, other
automobile makers learned to produce automo-
bilesmoreefficiently.Romersuggeststhatcapital’s
shareofincomeinastandardgrowthaccounting
equation, when externalities are considered, is
substantially larger than reported by the BLS.
10
Theeffectsofalternativeassumptionsonesti-
mates of the contribution of computing equip-
menttooutputgrowthduringthe1972-96period
areshowninTable4.Thetablereportstheaverage
contribution of computing equipment to output
growthaswellasthetwocomponentsofthecon-
tribution that are affected by changes in the




the first row of the table provides estimates of
these items under the standard framework.
The second row of the table documents the
contribution of computing equipment to output




rate of return is substantially larger than in the




of the income share of computing equipment;
therefore,theincomeshareofcomputingequip-
ment has also been substantially changed. The
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Table 4
ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES OF THE CONTRIBUTION OF COMPUTING










Standard framework .13 .0089 .31
Romer (lower bound case) .42 .0136 .48
Romer (upper bound case) .64 .0171 .60
DeLong and Summers .47 .0142 .50
Brynjolfsson and Hitt .36 .0127 .45
Notes: Author’s calculations are based upon data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Bureau of Labor
Statistics.Allfiguresareaveragedoverthe1972-96period. Ineachofthealternativeestimates,therealcapitalstockof
computing equipment grew at an average rate of 34.96 percent per year.resultsofthesemodificationsaresummarizedin
the last column of table, which reports that the
contribution of computing equipment to output
growthunderRomer’slowerboundassumption
averaged 0.48 percentage point over the 1972-96
periodandwasmorethan50percentlargerthan
the contribution of computer equipment to out-





put growth. Under these more extreme assump-
tions, both the average nominal competitive net
rateofreturnandtheincomeshareofcomputing
equipment are larger than under the standard
framework and under Romer’s assumption about
the lower bound of the effect of externalities.
Hence, the contribution of computing equip-
menttooutputgrowth,whichaveraged0.60per-
centagepointunderRomer’supperboundcase,
is larger than in either of the two other cases.
DeLongandSummers(1991,1992)alsosuggest
thatinvestmentinequipmentgeneratessubstan-
tial externalities. DeLong and Summers recog-
nize the importance of knowledge spillovers in
generating these externalities but also emphasize
learning-by-doing as another channel through
which externalities are generated. In this chan-
nel, using equipment provides feedback so that
existingequipmentcanbemoreefficientlyused
and modifications to future versions of the equip-
ment can be made. Rosenberg cites the produc-
tion and development of the DC-8 aircraft as an
example. As the producers of the DC-8 gained
increasing confidence in and a greater under-
standingoftheaircraftasaresultofairlinesflying
the plane, they made substantial modifications






1960-85 period, a one-percentage-point increase














ties, the average contribution of computing
equipment to output growth rises to 0.50 per-
centage point.
A second feature of the standard growth
accounting framework used in this analysis is
that all capital assets are assumed to yield the
same nominal net rate of return. Some people
argue that this assumption is inappropriate for a
dynamic technology such as computers. They
claim that computers generate nominal net
returns that exceed the returns to other capital
assets.
One study examines the possibility that com-
putingequipmentgeneratesprivatenominalnet
ratesofreturninexcessofthereturnsgenerated
by other capital assets. Brynjolfsson and Hitt
examine a group of 367 firms over the 1987-91
period. They estimate that the average annual
grossrateofreturntocomputingequipmentover
the period was 81 percent.
The bottom row of Table 4 documents the
implications of incorporating the gross returns
earned by computing equipment into the stan-
dard framework. The average nominal rate of
return consistent with a gross rate of return for
the entire 1972-96 period is 36 percent, almost
three times the size of the net rate of return for
other capital assets.
16 As a result, when it is
36 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYassumedthatthenetrateofreturntocomputing
equipment exceeds that of other capital assets,
thecontributionofcomputingequipmenttoout-
put growth is 0.45 percentage point.
17
Summarizing, computing equipment has made
onlyamodestcontributiontothegrowthofout-
put when measured using the standard frame-
work.Whenmodificationstothisframeworkare
made, however, these contributions become
larger.
18 The next section examines whether the
contribution of computing equipment to output
growth might increase in the future.
III.WHAT MIGHT THE
FUTURE HOLD?
Until now, although the share of investment
spending on computing equipment has increased,
investment in computing equipment has made
only a modest contribution to overall output
growth.Akeyquestioniswhetherthecontribu-
tion of computing equipment to output growth
will increase in the future. The answer to this
question may help economists and policy ana-
lystsbetterassessfutureprospectsforeconomic
growthandinflation.Thissectiondiscusseshow
large the contribution of computing equipment
tooutputgrowthmightbeinthefuture.First,the
section examines the output contribution of com-
puting equipment in the standard framework
under various assumptions about the future
income share of computing equipment and the
stock of computing equipment. Second, it dis-
cussesapopularargumentthattheoutputcontri-
bution of computing equipment is likely to
increase significantly in the future.
What insight into the future does the
standard framework give?
The standard growth accounting framework
suggeststhatthekeydeterminantsofthecontri-
bution of computing equipment to output
growth are the rate of growth of the real capital






put growth has been mitigated by slowing
growth in the real capital stock of computing
equipment.
Onewaytoassessthepossiblefuturecontribu-
tions of computing equipment to output growth
isbyusingthesamestandardgrowthaccounting
framework.Theframeworkwillprovideconser-
vative estimates of the impact of computing
equipment in the future because it assumes that
computing equipment does not generate any
externalities. The future contributions of comput-
ingequipment to output growth can be assessed
bymakingassumptionsaboutthefuturepathsof
the income share of computing equipment and
the growth rate of the real capital stock.
First, consider a relatively pessimistic sce-
nario where the share of income generated by
computing equipment and the real capital stock
of computing equipment grow at their average
rates for the 1990s, about 4.1 percent and 24.8
percent, respectively. Under this scenario, the
contribution of computing equipment to output
growthisexpectedtorisemodestlyoverthenext
decade, adding about 0.55 percentage point to
output growth in 2006.
Second, consider a relatively optimistic sce-
nario, where the share of income generated by
computingequipmentandtherealstockofcom-
putingequipmentgrowattheiraverageratesfor
the 1992-96 period, about 6.8 percent and 30.5
percent, respectively.
19 Under this scenario, the
contribution of computing equipment to output
growth is expected to rise more dramatically
overthenextdecade,addingalmost0.9percent-
age point to output growth in 2006.
20
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history give?
The previous subsection offered two possible
scenarios for the importance of computing equip-
ment in growth in the future. However, some
economists have suggested that even the rela-
tively optimistic one might be a conservative
vision of the future. This subsection outlines
some of the arguments in support of that view.
Some economists argue that the contribution
of computing equipment to output growth is
likely to increase significantly in the future.
These economists suggest that the real produc-
tivity gains and externalities from a radical new
technology are not realized until decades after
the technology has first been introduced.
Economic historian Paul David compares the
innovations of the “computer revolution,” fueled
by advances in microprocessors and memory
chips, to the innovations of the “second Indus-
trialRevolution,”whichwasfueledbytheelectric
dynamo. Michael Faraday first demonstrated
the principle of the electric motor in 1821;
Zénobe Théophile Gramme demonstrated the
first electric motor of commercial significance
in 1873; the first central generating plant was
built in New York in 1882; yet the impact of the
dynamo on productivity was not felt until about
1920,whentheextentofelectrificationattained
the 50 percent diffusion level.
21
David identifies a number of reasons why
the contributions of computers, like those of
the dynamo, might diffuse gradually. First, com-
puters and dynamos are both central elements
of transmission networks. As a result, these
technologies give rise to “network externality
effects,” which may lead to slow diffusion. For
example,businessesmightberelativelyunwill-
ingtoinvestinacomputersystemunlessastan-
dard computer operating system has emerged,
justasbusinesseswerereluctanttobuyelectrical
machinery until a standard electric outlet size
emerged.
Second, like the dynamo, computers have
become more effective as they have become




airlines. This feature suggests that diffusion is
particularly slow during the early stages of the
technology’s dispersion.
Third, the adoption of a new technology is
oftenslowedbecauseitrequiresmajorreorgani-
zation of production. In the case of the dynamo
revolution, many firms found it unprofitable to
replace existing manufacturing plants powered
by water and steam. Electric power made its
greatest inroads into industries that were grow-
ingrapidly,andthusbuildingnewplants,around
the turn of the century.
JeremyGreenwoodalsoarguesthatthegreat-
est benefits from new technologies often take
severaldecadestoberealized.Hecitesthe“Indus-
trial Revolution” in Britain and the American
Antebellum period as examples of this. In both
oftheseepisodes,productivityactuallyfellprior
tothebeginningoftheepisodeandthenrosedra-
matically near the end of the episode.
Greenwood suggests that two factors, which
are very applicable to the current “computer
revolution,” explain this observation. First, one
substantialcostofintroducingnewtechnologies
isthattheyrequireaperiodoflearning.Thecosts
involved include the costs of foregoing produc-
tionwhiletrainingemployeesandmakingmis-
takes on the relatively unfamiliar equipment. As
businesses and employees become more famil-
iar with the new technology, they will require
lesstraining,makefewermistakes,andbecapa-
bleofspeedingupproduction.Second,asDavid
also observes, the diffusion of new technologies
38 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITYis often slow. The slow diffusion of a new tech-
nology makes learning about how to efficiently
utilize the new technology more difficult. Over
time, as the new technology becomes more widely
used,learningabouthowtomostefficientlyuse
the technology becomes more rapid, leading to
more rapid increases in productivity.
The analyses of David and Greenwood sug-
gest that the largest productivity gains from
computing equipment, and hence the largest
gains in the contribution of computing equip-
menttooutputgrowth,mightlieinthefuture.In
some industries, investment in computers has
already led to some productivity gains. In his
analysis of the electric industry, Donald Allen
findsthatanaccelerationofinvestmentininfor-
mation technology appears to have preceded
an increase in productivity. Still, although it is
appealing to try to draw conclusions about the
future of productivity gains from computing
equipment based on analogies with the past,
another economic historian, Joel Mokyr, warns
that“historicalanalogiesoftenmisleadasmuch
as they instruct and in technological progress,
wherechangeisunpredictable,cumulative,and
irreversible, the analogies are more dangerous
than anywhere.”
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Thedramaticincreaseinspendingoncomput-
ers over the past several decades has led many
analyststosuggestthattheeconomyhasentered
aNewErainwhichcomputershavemadealarge
impact on economic activity. In particular, the
analysts cite rapid growth in computer invest-
ment as the motivation for this view. However,
rapid growth in investment is only one of the
conditions needed for computer equipment to
makealargeimpactontheeconomy.Evenifthis
rapidgrowthininvestmentincomputingequip-
ment translates into rapid growth in the capital
stockofcomputingequipment,theincomeshare
of computer capital must be large.
This article has used an analytical framework
toquantitativelyassesstheimpactofcomputers






to the size of the economy. When modifications
to the standard growth accounting framework
aremadetoreflectthepossibilitythatcomputers
are“special,”inthesensethatcomputersgener-
ate significant positive external benefits or that
they generate larger private rates of return than
other capital equipment, the contribution of com-
puting equipment to economic growth is some-
what larger. However, in both the standard and
modified frameworks there is no evidence that
thecontributionofcomputingequipmenttoeco-
nomic growth is any greater now than it was in
the late 1970s.
Some argue, however, that even though
computers have not yet led us into a New Era,
the full benefit from past investment in com-
puting equipment and continued development
of computer technologies and applications of
computer technologies may not yet have been
realized.Acomputer-relatedproductivityboom
may be somewhere on the not-too-distant
horizon.Whetherornotthesepropheciescome
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1 For discussions of this view, see articles by Mandel and
Shepard.
2Inthissection,the1982-96periodwasusedbecause1982
was the earliest year in which data on computer spending






close approximations to the exact shares. Although exact
shares of chain-weighted real GDP cannot be calculated,
the shares of real GDP calculated using chain-weighted
data are not sensitive to the choice of the base year. Oliner
and Sichel argued that under the fixed weight measure of
GDP, the share of computers in real GDP was highly
dependentonthechoiceofthebaseyear.Oneadvantageof
examining real shares rather than nominal shares is that it
givesabettersenseoftheproliferationofcomputersinthe
economy, particularly since the price of computers has
declinedsodramatically.Foradiscussionoftheadvantages
of the chain-weighted measure of GDP, see papers by
Landefeld and Parker; Steindel; and Parker and Triplett.
4 Growth accounting allocates the growth rate of national
outputamongthedeterminantsofoutputthatchangedand
caused growth.
5 Prior to 1997, the BEA did not publish measures of the
capital stock of computers and peripheral equipment.
6 The nominal competitive net rate of return is calculated
for each year using the following identity:
si p p Ki p p Ec c c c O E O E O E =+- ++ - [( & )( & ) dd KOE ] / PY ,
where sE is the income share for nonresidential equipment,
whichispublishedbytheBLS,andthesubscriptOErefersto
equipment other than computers. The variable & pOE is the
growth rate of the price deflator for equipment other than
computersandiscomputedanalogouslyto & pc.Thenominal
net capital stock of computing equipment other than
computers, pK OE OE, was calculated using BEA data. The
depreciationrateforequipmentotherthancomputers,dOE,
wasobtainedbyweightingthedepreciationratesforallthe
assets, except computing equipment, in the nonresidential
equipment category, as reported in Fraumeni, by each of
these assets’ shares of the total nominal capital stock of
equipment other than computing equipment. This series
changes from year to year, reflecting the changing
composition of the capital stock of equipment.
Estimates of the competitive nominal net rate of return
ranged from a minimum of 6.6 percent in 1983 to a
maximum of 28.9 percent in 1974 and averaged 13.3
percent over the 1972-96 period.
7 This relationship can be formally derived by assuming
that the aggregate production function takes the simple
form YF K L t = (,, ) where K is the capital input, L is the
labor input, and t represents the shift in the production
technology over time. Differentiating the production
function with respect to time yields && && .
Y s K s L MFP KL =+ +
where & K, & L,andMFP & representthegrowthratesofthereal
capital stock, labor input, and multifactor productivity,
respectively, and sk and sL are the income shares of the
capital stock and labor input.
8 In the case of computing equipment this is actually a
capital loss because, when adjusted for changes in quality,




that, for many manufacturing industries, the ratio of benefits
from investment in high-technology equipment to the
benefits from investing in high-technology equipment
declined between 1972 and 1991. Morrison finds that a
surge in returns to high-technology investment in the late
1970s was followed by a slump, indicating some
overinvestment in the early to late 1980s.
10The BLS reports that the income share of capital is
approximately 30 percent. Romer suggests that when
externalitiesareincluded,theincomeshareofcapitalcould
range from a lower bound of 70 percent to an upper bound
of 100 percent.
11 For each set of alternative assumptions, the real capital
stock of computing equipment grew at an average rate of
34.96 percent each year.
12Tomodifythenominal competitivenetrateofreturnso
that it is consistent with Romer’s estimates of the effect of
externalities the procedure described in endnote 5 was
slightlymodified.Theincomesharesforequipmentusedin
calculating the nominal net rate of return have been
adjusted. For the high-return case, the BLS income share
forequipmentwasmultipliedby3.33,whichrepresentsthe
ratio of Romer’s upper bound for the income share of
capitaltotheaverageincomeshareforcapitalpublishedby
theBLS.Similarly,forthelow-returncasetheBEAincome
share for equipment is multiplied by 2.33.
40 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY13 Learning-by-doing can also affect how a firm uses its
equipment. In the aircraft example, as airlines learn more
about the aircraft they are flying they are able to develop
more efficient maintenance schedules and operating
procedures. David (1975) offers another example of
learning-by-doing. He documents substantial increases in
productivity for a cotton mill in Lowell, Massachusetts,
between 1836 and 1856 despite the fact that no new
equipment had been added. This suggests that the
productivityincreasesforthemillwerelargelyattributable
to learning effects.
14 This estimate was taken from Table 6 in DeLong and
Summers (1992).
15Tocalculatethenominalnetrateofreturnconsistentwith
DeLong and Summers’estimates the analysis follows the
procedure used in Oliner and Sichel and developed by
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wherebE =0.151istheDeLongandSummersestimate,t=
25 is the sample length used in DeLong and Summers’
estimation,dEisthedepreciationrateforequipment,and & pE
is the annual rate of capital gain for equipment. l is
calculated as la ad =- - + () ( ) , 1 ES E g where a e and a S
arethesharesofequipmentandstructuresintheeconomy,g
is the sum of the growth rates of labor force and labor
productivity,anddEisthedepreciationrateforequipment.
16 The nominal rate of return was chosen so that the gross
rate of return averaged 81 percent, given annual
depreciation and the annual rate of growth in computer
prices.
17 For the period over which Brynjolfsson and Hitt’s
estimates were made, 1987-91, when computing
equipmentisassumedtogeneratelargernetratesofreturn
thanothercapitalassets,computingequipmentcontributed
an average of 0.30 percentage point to output growth. For
the purposes of comparison, if computing equipment is
assumedtogeneratethesamereturnsasothercapitalassets,
as in the standard framework, computing equipment
contributed an average of 0.20 percentage point to output
growth during the 1987-91 period.
18 The modifications made to the standard neoclassical
frameworkarebasedonstudiesthathavebeencriticizedin
somequarters.Forexample,Auerbach,Hassett,andOliner
have argued that DeLong and Summers provided no
statistically significant evidence that equipment
investment resulted in positive externalities for OECD
countries. Furthermore, Romer (1994) appears to have
backed off his earlier claims that investment in physical
capital generates external benefits in favor of the
hypothesis that research and knowledge gathering
activities are an important source of external benefits.
19 The 1992-96 time period that is used to calculate the
averages used in the relatively optimistic scenario reflects
the growth of the income share of computing equipment
and the real stock of computing equipment during an
expansion.
20 Of course, these two scenarios do not encompass the
entire range of possibilities. During various periods since
1972, the share of income generated by computing
equipment and the growth rate of the real stock of
computingequipmenthavebeenlargerandsmallerthanin
thetwoscenariosconsideredinthetext.Forexample,over
the 1987-91 period, the share of income generated by
computing equipment actually fell by about 0.6 percent
each year while the real capital stock of computing
equipment rose 24.8 percent each year. Under this very
pessimistic scenario, the contribution of computing
equipment would be expected to decline slowly over the
nextdecade,addingonly0.24percentagepointtogrowthin
2006. However, over the 1977-81 period, the share of
income generated by computers rose 11.9 percent each
year, while the real stock of computing equipment rose
almost 57 percent each year. Under this extremely
optimistic scenario, computing equipment might be
expectedtocontributeanastounding2.6percentagepoints
to growth.
Both of these two scenarios appear to be outliers. In the
case of the very pessimist scenario, only the five-year
period beginning in 1988 experienced slower average
growth in the share of income generated by computing
equipment or the real capital stock of computing
equipment.Inthecaseoftheveryoptimisticscenario,only
the five-year period beginning in 1978 experienced faster
average growth in the share of income generated by
computing equipment or in the real capital stock of
computing equipment.
21Diffusionisameasureofthedegreetowhichaparticular
technology has penetrated the economy. In the example of
the electric dynamo, the 50 percent diffusion level
represents the point at which electric motor horsepower
accounted for 50 percent of the total mechanical drive
horsepower used in manufacturing establishments.
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